We develop a model of a prediction market with ambiguity and derive testable implications of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Our model can also explain two commonly observed empirical regularities in betting markets: the tendency for longshots to win less often than odds would indicate and the tendency for favorites to win more often. Using historical data from Intrade, we further present empirical evidence that is consistent with the predicted presence of Knightian uncertainty. Our evidence also suggests that, even with information acquisition, the Knightian uncertainty of the world may be not "learnable" to the traders in prediction markets.
Introduction
At least since the work of Knight (1921) , economists have understood that economic agents may behave di¤erently in risky circumstances, where outcomes are random but governed by known probabilities, as opposed to uncertain circumstances, where risks are unknown. Ellsberg (1961) provides examples that highlight the tendency for some decision makers to be averse to the presence of Knightian uncertainty-or, ambiguity.
In recent years, there has been an explosion of theoretical work developing models that incorporate ambiguity aversion, building o¤ of the seminal contribution of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . In the literature to date, Knightian uncertainty has been a factor inserted in a model that could possibly explain puzzling observations. It has served a role analogous to that of dark matter in cosmological models, lurking behind the scenes to explain observed phenomena, never being directly observed. At the same time, a rich literature has evolved exploring the e¢ciency of betting and prediction markets that price speci…c events. Following on the early work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Asch, Malkiel and Quandt (1982) , the ability of these markets to predict future events has been studied extensively, and a number of empirical anomalies have been identi…ed.
In this paper, we extend the theoretical literature and connect it to the predictionmarket application. In so doing, we develop more direct observable implications of the presence of Knightian uncertainty than has been achieved previously in the literature, and a method to test for its presence.
While we below will formally derive a model that suggests our test, the intuition of our approach is quite straightforward and can be illustrated using an example from Ellsberg (1961) . Suppose that we have two urns. In one urn, we have 50 black balls and 50 red balls.
In another urn-the "Knightian urn"-we have 100 balls, but we have no information regarding the proportions. A subject is o¤ered a game. If she pulls a black ball out of the urn, she wins $1. If she pulls a red ball out she wins nothing. The literature has documented a tendency for individuals to prefer the urn with the known probabilities, suggesting that 2 they exhibit the aversion to ambiguity discussed above.
Suppose that an econometrician could observe games played with both of the urns in Ellsberg's game. With a number of repeated trials, the sample proportions from the …rst urn would fairly rapidly indicate an estimate that the binomial probability of victory is 50 percent. With enough data, one would say that with great con…dence. On the other hand, if one observed repeated play with the second, Knightian urn which, after all, has some number of black balls in it, then the sample proportion would also converge to an estimated binomial probability, but that probability would not necessarily be 50 percent.
The observation that motivates this paper stems from this thought experiment. Given a market derived ex ante probability of a binary event, as one frequently observes in betting markets, there will naturally be circumstances where information is extremely solid, and odds are quite far from 50 percent. There will also be situations where information suggests there is an even match (as with a coin ‡ip), and the contract suggests there is close to a 50 percent chance of either outcome. This often happens, for example, in presidential futures markets in the U.S. after the conventions are over. But it is also possible that there are contracts that suggest that the odds of either outcome are 50 percent because the event is shrouded in ambiguity. If we were to estimate the ex post sample proportions from just these contracts with ex ante 50 percent probabilities, then they could, as in the Ellsberg example above, be anything. If we were to estimate the ex post sample proportions of the high information contracts with probabilities far from 50 percent, the proportions and ex ante probabilities should, if markets are e¢cient, align. But close to 50 percent, they might not, and if they do not, it is an indication of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Thus, the pattern by which the relationship between ex post proportions and ex ante probabilities deviates from the 45 degree line becomes informative regarding the presence of Knightian uncertainty. We also discuss the extent to which learning can occur in markets over time.
If Knightian uncertainty induces knowledge acquisition, then the relationship between proportions and probabilities will evolve as a market matures, a possibility we explore in the 3 paper.
The next subsection brie ‡y reviews the literature. In Sections 2 and 3, we draw on the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Dow and Werlang (1992) and develop a model that suggests that the pattern described by our intuitive example would emerge in a market in ‡uenced by the present of signi…cant Knightian uncertainty. In Section 4, we provide some high-level evidence that the relationship between ex post proportions and ex ante probabilities is consistent with the predictions of our model. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper draws from two di¤erent strands in the literature. First, theorists have made remarkable strides in recent years incorporating Knightian uncertainty and ambiguity aversion into models of …nancial markets.
These models have, according to an exhaustive recent review, "implications for portfolio choice and asset pricing that are very di¤erent from those of SEU (subjective expected utility theory) and that help to explain otherwise puzzling features of the data." 1 Ambiguity aversion could help explain the tendency of markets to stop operating during …nancial crises, for prices to not be completely informative, and even for there to be bank runs. 2 This branch of the literature has focused on …nancial markets in general. At the same time, an equally impressive literature has emerged exploring the functioning of prediction markets, which, for the most part, price in the probability of speci…c binary events. As Thaler and Ziemba (1988) …rst noted, these prediction markets may be a better laboratory to test cutting edge theories, as they contain contracts with known durations, and observable discrete events that stop the trading. While an equity might live on virtually forever, a presidential election future has a speci…c end date, and its ability to forecast the outcome can be precisely evaluated. 1 
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This second literature has advanced both empirically and theoretically. On the theoretical side, Ali (1977) and Manski (2004) illustrate that the beliefs of bettors may not necessarily yield a market-based probability. More recently, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) identify the conditions under which prediction-market prices coincide with bettors' mean beliefs about probabilities. On the empirical side, prediction markets have been found to be informative regarding the odds of events occurring. Berg et al. (2008) , for example, …nd that the Iowa Electronic Markets outperformed polls in predicting election outcomes. At the same time, markets have been found to exhibit a favorite-longshot bias, with favorites outperforming their odds, and longshots underperforming (see, e.g., Cain, Law and Peel, 2000) . A number of possible explanations for this pattern include insider trading (Shin, 1992) , risk-loving behavior (Weitzman, 1965; Quandt, 1986) , belief dispersion (Gandhi and Serrano-Padia, 2015), and imperfect ability to process information (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010 ).
The connection of these two literatures seems quite promising, as betting markets often exist for events, such as Brexit or elections, for which Knightian uncertainty may well be present. Since they also have …nite and determinate life spans, they also allow the econometrician the ability to evaluate their performance ex post. We now turn to illustrating the utility of this approach.
A Model of Prediction Market with Ambiguity

Setup
Events and Contracts. Consider a prediction market for the occurrence of a binary event. There are two all-or-nothing contracts corresponding to the two possible realizations.
One contract pays $1 if event A occurs and $0 otherwise, while the other contract pays $1 if the complementary event A c occurs and $0 otherwise. Let denote the price of contract A. No-arbitrage condition dictates that, in equilibrium, the price of contract A c be 1 .
Traders. There is a continuum I of competitive traders, each endowed with homogeneous initial wealth w. The "net" position on contract A held by trader i is denoted by x i 2 R. 3 Given price , the …nal wealth w i of trader i is
All traders have log utility of their …nal wealth: u (w i ) = ln w i .
Beliefs and Ambiguity. Suppose trader i has a subjective belief that event A occurs with probability e q 2 [0; 1]. Then, the subjective expected utility of trader i from holding position x i at price is given by
However, ambiguity exists, for traders may be uncertain about how likely event A is to occur. We follow Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and model ambiguity using the "multiple-prior" framework. Speci…cally, suppose each trader i considers every probability e q 2 [q i ; q i + ], where 0, an admissible probability that governs the realization of the binary event. Under this framework, q i represents the "mean" belief of trader i, while is interpreted as a measure of ambiguity. Given price , trader i chooses position x i to maximize the minimum-that is, the worst-case scenario-of all her admissible, subjective expected utilities: for the most pessimistic trader, the worst-case belief that A occurs is probability 0 while, for the most optimistic trader, the best-case belief that A occurs is probability 1.
Optimal Demand and Portfolio Inertia
Solving the inner minimization reduces the optimization problem (1) to
where sgn ( ) is an indicator function that takes the sign of its argument.
The intuition behind the above expression is straightforward. If trader i has a positive position on contract A, then the worst-case scenario would be that event A occurs with probability q i , the lower bound. Similarly, if the position of trader i is negative, then, in the worst-case scenario, event A occurs with the upper-bound probability, q i + .
Solving the maximization problem gives the optimal (net) demand for contract A by trader i,
as a function of price and mean belief. Therefore, trader i longs contract A when the price is lower than her most pessimistic belief, and shorts contract A when the price is higher than her most optimistic belief. For any price in the intermediate range [q i ; q i + ], trader i does not participate in the prediction market-the phenomenon of portfolio inertia.
That portfolio inertia arises when investors have maxmin preferences is well known in the …nance literature since the work by Dow and Werlang (1992) . The setup of this model replicates this phenomenon in the context of prediction markets. In particular, for each 7 trader, the size of price region at which portfolio inertia occurs is given by 2 . In other words, the higher the degree of ambiguity, the more inertial the traders' portfolios.
Equilibrium
Given price for contract A and distribution function F of traders' mean beliefs, the aggregate (net) demand for the contract is given by
The prediction market is in equilibrium when the aggregate demand for contract A equals zero, that is, X F ( ) = 0. The following proposition establishes the equilibrium price. 4 Proposition 1 Given distribution function F , the equilibrium price F is such that
When ambiguity is absent (i.e., = 0) the prediction market aggregates the "wisdom of crowds:"
That is, the equilibrium price of contract A corresponds to the average of traders' mean beliefs about the occurrence of event A.
In the presence of ambiguity, however, the prediction market does not necessarily aggregate the wisdom of crowds. In particular, it aggregates the wisdom of crowds if and only
The next proposition shows that the situations in which such equality happens to hold are topologically rare.
Proposition 2 With ambiguity, the prediction market "rarely" aggregates the wisdom of crowds. Formally, let be the space of probability distributions over [ ; 1 ], endowed with the weak topology. Then, the subset of probability distributions such that the equilibrium price equals the average of traders' mean beliefs is nowhere dense in .
Propositions 1 and 2 together suggests that the presence of ambiguity renders the prediction market ine¤ective in aggregating the beliefs held by heterogeneous traders.
Proposition 3
The equilibrium quantity of trades is strictly decreasing in the degree of ambiguity.
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of portfolio inertia. As the degree of ambiguity increases, the "inaction range" of each trader i, [q i ; q i + ], becomes wider. Since each trader is more likely to stay put in a more ambiguous environment, the aggregate trades must be fewer as well. This result is reminiscent of well-known models of ambiguity in …nancial economics (e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2010; and
Routledge and Zin,2009), which suggest that a signi…cant increase in Knightian uncertainty may contribute to liquidity hoarding and market breakdown.
Moreover, the deterrence of trades in a particular way is what causes the failure of the prediction market to aggregate beliefs. Speci…cally, for any prevailing price , the traders who stay put are those with moderate beliefs such that their inaction ranges cover . Those who trade have beliefs that are more extreme-either more optimistic or more pessimistic-than the abstainers. Suppose the abstaining traders did trade, the chance of the hypothetical market price, after aggregating the abstaining traders' beliefs, happens to be exactly the same as is zero.
Testable Implications
The previous section has derived the equilibrium results under ambiguity. However, since the degree of ambiguity is not observable, those results cannot be tested directly. In this 9 section, we impose more structures on the model and derive implications that are testable with prediction-market data.
Preliminaries
Suppose the true probability that event A occurs is given by p 2 
where F is some continuous distribution function of q over [ ; 1 ].
The functional form of F is left unspeci…ed. We let denote the integral of F , i.e.,
The interpretation of Assumption 1 is that there are some traders whose beliefs happen to be correct. One could provide a micro-foundation for this setup by assuming that, prior to trading, the mass m of traders have received imperfect private signals that are partially informative of the true probability, while other traders have received no such signals. With such a micro-foundation, the traders' (multiple) beliefs can be interpreted as their (multiple) posteriors. In this section, we adopt a reduced-form approach and build these details directly into the distribution function F .
One may wonder to what extent the mass of traders with correct mean beliefs matters to deriving testable implications. As will be clear in the next subsection, our theoretical result does not depend on the exact value of m. Whether the mass is extremely small, in which case few traders have the correct beliefs, or very large, which means most traders do, the main result is unchanged. The essence of this setup is that a fraction of traders are, to some extent, "informed" about the true probability. Therefore, whether they trade-or not, should they choose to abstain-makes a qualitative di¤erence in the equilibrium price.
Implications
Since the distribution function F is given and parameterized by the true probability p,
applying Proposition 1 allows us to solve for the equilibrium price as a function of p, as shown below.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium price (p) is:
3. strictly increasing for p = which cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium price of a longshot must be signi…cantly larger than the longshot's odds.
Note that, although the degree of ambiguity, , is not directly observable in reality, Proposition 4 yields implications of the presence of ambiguity that are testable with prediction-market data. Suppose an econometrician could conduct a large number of repeated trials for each value of the true probability. Then, with enough data, the ex post sample proportion, denoted by P , would converge to the corresponding true probability, p.
It follows that the estimated relationship between P and the market price, , would converge to the graph of the correspondence p = ( ) 1 ( ). As in Figure 1 , such ideal trials would show a big jump at price level = b , with P being generally below the 45-degree line below but close to b , and above it just thereafter. Moreover, since the relationship between P and fundamentally shifts between the two continuous segments, our result suggests a testable structural change near the jump in at b .
Before conducting the test, the econometrician may not know where the jump would appear, because b , given by
depends on the distribution of mean beliefs among all prediction-market traders. It follows from the above equation that b would be smaller than 0:5 if F is skewed towards the lowest mean belief , and larger than 0:5 if F is skewed towards the highest mean belief 1 . But when F is symmetrically distributed over [ ; 1 ], b would be equal to 0:5, which is the following corollary.
In practice, the empirical chart would precisely follow Figure 1 with the jump at 0:5 in the case of symmetry, but not if asymmetries were present. But even if one might expect skewness to be present for some contracts but not others, the range for the crossover point could be scattered about the neighborhood of 0:5. The aggregation of a large number of contracts, therefore, could push the average b to be in the neighborhood of 0:5. Since each contract would exhibit a similar (if slightly shifted) pattern, the overall pattern should loosely follow Figure 1 if Knightian uncertainty is important in these markets, even though some re ‡ect symmetry whereas others do not.
Accordingly, the theory suggests that the empirical relationship between P and would contain a testable structural break about the neighborhood of 0:5, where one would expect to see observations scattered below the 45-degree line to the left of the break-point, and above the 45-degree line to the right. The presence of a structural break adjacent to 0:5, 13 therefore, would be an indication that Knightian uncertainty is a factor in the market, and would be consistent with the intuition provided in the introduction.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide some high-level evidence that is consistent with the theoretical predictions. 5 We use the historical data from Intrade, a popular online prediction platform which operated from 2003 to 2013. The platform hosted prediction contracts across wide-ranging categories of events, such as business (e.g., whether the CEO of a certain company would step down), current events (e.g., which city would host the Olympic), entertainment (e.g., which movie would win the Academy Award for the Best Picture), politics (e.g., which candidate would be elected the U.S. president), etc. We collect all those contracts that are on binary events, regardless of their categories, and record how each binary event had turned out.
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the ex post sample proportion, P , of event A's occurrence as a function of the ex ante price, , of contract A. We process the data in the following way. The observations are sorted by price and evenly partitioned into a number of percentile bins. For each percentile bin, we calculate the sample proportion of event A's occurrences whose corresponding prices fall into that bin. Finally, we plot the sample proportions against the mid-points of the corresponding price bins.
If the theory developed in the previous section holds, the following is what one would expect in the empirics. Recall that the value of b depends on the distribution of mean beliefs among traders. Since each observation in the dataset is from a certain market with a certain distribution of mean beliefs held by the participating traders, we can interpret each observation as a single draw from the data-generating process associated with a certain 5 See Appendix B for the details of the data. Figure 1 . For a price bin closer to 0, therefore, it is more likely that the observations contained in the bin have been drawn from the left part of Figure 1 , i.e., below the break-point. Similarly, for a price bin closer to 1, the observations are more likely to have been drawn from the right part of Figure 1 , i.e., above the break-point. More important, when the price bin is near 0:5, the observations are more likely to be from just around the jump, suggesting a structural break.
version of
We start with the empirical evidence from political events, one of the largest categories in the Intrade dataset. These events, like Brexit and U.S. presidential elections, often see a high volume of transactions between bettors. We are interested in whether there is a discontinuity in the relationship between the price and the sample proportion, which falls into the well-developed literature about testing structural breaks. For each panel of Figure 2 , we conduct three analyses. First, a linear regression assuming no structural breaks is shown as the dashed line in the diagram. Next, we run two types of break-point tests-an F test 6 and a "moving sum of residuals" (MO-SUM) test 7 -against the null hypothesis that there is no structural breaks for the entire sample. Lastly, we re-run the linear regression by estimating the location of one break-point 6 The F test is an extension of the "Chow test" (1960), against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown break-point. See, e.g., Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) for details. 7 The MOSUM test analyzes the moving sum of residuals and detects whether a strong shift of the ‡uctuation process exists. See, e.g., Chu, Hornik, and Kuan (1995a, b) for details. the linear regression without breaks shows, the speci…c pattern of observations also causes the regression line to have a slope larger-albeit only slightly-than 1.
Another important di¤erence between the two panels is that, in panel (b), more observations are clustered near price levels 0 and 1. This means, by the last day, more traders hold (posterior) beliefs that some outcome-either A or A c -is very likely to be realized, suggesting a decrease in risks over time. Such a decrease in risks can be a result of information acquisition by the traders, who, until the random events resolve, may have the incentives to learn about the events and update their bets accordingly. Since risks have decreased while ambiguity remains, our empirical evidence also suggests an observational distinction between the concepts of risk and Knightian uncertainty.
Furthermore, the above empirical patterns are to some extent robust against the choice of the number of bins. Figure 3 reproduces the diagram by partitioning the data into 30 bins instead. The column "30 bins" of Table 1 shows the details of the regression and break-point analysis. Overall, the observations drawn earlier still hold. 8 The observation that ambiguity remains until the last trading day suggests, unlike risks, Knightian uncertainty may be not "learnable" in practice to the traders. The intuition can be illustrated using the Knightian urn where the composition of black and red balls is unknown. Imagine two di¤erent scenarios. In the …rst scenario, a subject observed repeated draws from the same Knightian urn. In this case, the sample proportion over time would reveal the true composition of the two colors because, after all, the composition is …xed over time. In the second scenario, there was an experimenter who replaced the Knightian urn with a new one every time a ball was drawn by the subject. In this case, the sample proportion may not inform the subject of what to expect in the next Knightian urn, simply because the composition of black and red balls in the new urn could be anything of the experimenter's choosing. If the underlying data-generating process-that is, the way the experimenter changed every other Knightian urn-was not learnable to the subject, then the degree of ambiguity would not decrease over time. 9 One might think that, in politics, it is intuitively easy for traders to acquire knowledge-from polls, news reports, political analyses, etc. Yet, our empirical evidence, which is based on a large number of prediction markets about various political events, seems to …t the second scenario, suggesting that the Knightian uncertainty of politics may indeed be not "learnable" through information acquisition.
We now turn to another major category: entertainment events, such as the winners of cinematic awards or the box o¢ces of movies. Figures 4 and 5 reproduce the Pdiagram for 30 bins and 50 bins, respectively, and Table 2 reports the details of the regressions and break-point tests. Although qualitatively similar, the patterns are less pronounced compared to politics. The jump near 0:5 is less clear and, interestingly, the clustering near 0 and 1 is less marked. This evidence suggests less learning in entertainment than in politics, which is understandable since it is more di¢cult for bettors to acquire information about the general public's personal tastes of movies and music.
Politics and entertainment together account for over 80% of the Intrade dataset. However, for completeness, we reproduce the empirical evidence with the full sample, as shown in Figures 6 and 7 , as well as Table 3 . The patterns, essentially by construction, are similar to what we established above.
Concluding Remarks
Knightian uncertainty-an important theoretical concept in the literature that is often used to explain observed phenomena-has never been directly evidenced in an empirical setting.
In this paper, we have developed a model of a prediction market with ambiguity, where traders have maxmin preferences. We have derived more direct, observational implications of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Using the historical betting data from Intrade, we have further presented some high-level evidence that is consistent with the prediction of our model. In particular, for price levels close to 0:5, the market-implied, ex ante probability of a random event is not indicative of the ex post sample proportion, suggesting the presence of Knightian uncertainty.
Moreover, our empirical evidence has shown that, although traders seem to have acquired information which leads to a decrease in risks, ambiguity remains until the last trading day, suggesting that the Knightian uncertainty of the world may be not "learnable" to traders. By comparing political events and entertainment events, we have also shown that the empirical patterns we identi…ed are more pronounced in politics than in entertainment.
The evidence we have provided is only preliminary, since the empirics of this paper are based on a single prediction platform that is skewed towards political and entertainment events. In a future, empirical study, we will collect more prediction-market data across di¤erent platforms and di¤erent event types, and we will examine more closely the relationship between the ex post sample proportion and the ex ante price by taking into account the type of events, the time ahead of the resolution of randomness, and other aspects of the betting markets.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that any equilibrium price has to satisfy (i) > 2 and (ii) < 1 2 . If (i) does not hold, then q i + for all i, which means any trader will have either a long position or a zero position-not an equilibrium. Similarly, if (ii) does not hold, no trader will have a long position, which cannot be an equilibrium either.
Substitute (2) into (3) and rewrite the aggregate demand as
Hence, X F ( ) = 0 if and only if
where the last step follows from integration by parts. Simplifying and rearranging terms yields the stated expression in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let G be the space of distribution functions over [ ; 1 ], endowed with the Lévy metric`, wherè
for any G 1 ; G 2 2 G. Let F be the subset of G that satis…es F = E F (q) for any F 2 F.
Since the Lévy metric metrizes the weak topology, 10 the proposition is equivalent to the claim that F is nowhere dense in (G;`).
Note that F is closed. Since a set is nowhere dense if and only if the complement of its closure is dense, 11 , it remains to be shown G n F is dense, that is, for any point in G, there is a sequence from G n F converging to that point. It is thus enough to show, for any F 2 F and any > 0, there exists some G 2 G n F such that`(F; G) < .
F is non-decreasing since it is a distribution function. It follows that
We show prove the results by examining two cases.
Given > 0, we construct a distribution function G from F as
where 1 ; 2 > 0 are such that function g G F satis…es conditions
It is easily veri…ed that H is a mean-preserving spread of F , with two new atoms created at points E F (q) and E F (q) + + 4 . By construction, this implies that
where the last but second equality holds because F 2 F, and the last equality follows from the construction of H.
Since
H (q) dq > , H 2 G n F. Finally, similar to Case 1, we have (F; H) = 2 and, hence,`(F; H) < .
Proof of Proposition 3. Decompose X F ( ) into the aggregate supply (shorts) S F ( ) and the aggregate demand (longs) D F ( ), where
and S F ( F ) = D F ( F ) in equilibrium. We show that an increase in shifts the supply curve inwards. That is,
Similarly, an increase in shifts the demand curve inwards (i.e., dD F ( ) d < 0). It follows that the equilibrium quantity of trade-S F ( F ), or D F ( F )-has to be smaller as the degree of ambiguity increases.
23
Proof of Proposition 4. Let denote the integral of F , i.e., (q)
follows from the de…nition of F that
where is the integral of F . The equilibrium condition becomes = E F (q) + ( + ) ( )
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Since (q) has a kink at point p, the equilibrium price depends on the position of p relative to + and .
The equilibrium condition is rewritten as
Rearranging terms and dividing both sides by 1 m yields ( + ) + ( ) = 1 2 (1 ) :
Note that the left-hand side of equation (4) is strictly increasing in . Thus, the solution to the equation is a continuous and strictly increasing function of p. Furthermore, as
is the equilibrium price in Case 1, the right-hand side of equation (4) converges to 1 2 (1 ) + b m 1 m , and the solution to the equation converges to b . In other words, the equilibrium price is continuous at point p = b + .
Next, we show
(1 ) < 1 2 , which implies (1 ) < 1 in part 1 of the proposition. Let LHS ( ) and RHS (p) denote the left-and right-hand sides of equation (4), as functions of and p, respectively. Note that
Since LHS is strictly increasing in , the solution to the equation when p = 1 must be smaller than 1 2 .
Similar to Case 2, the solution to equation (5) is continuous and strictly increasing in p, and it converges to b as p ! b . Hence, the equilibrium price is continuous at point p = b as well.
Next, we show ( ) > 2 , which implies ( ) > in part 1 of the proposition. Again, let LHS ( ) and RHS (p) denote the left-and right-hand sides of equation (5) . Note that
where the last inequality holds because is the integral of distribution function F over
Since LHS is strictly increasing in , the solution to the equation when p = must be larger than 2 .
Proof of Corollary 5. Recall that b is identi…ed by equation
The symmetry of F implies
Appendix B Intrade Historical Data
The historical data of Intrade was archived by Ipeirotis (2013) and is available on GitHub. The total number of selected markets included in the …nal analysis also shown in Table 5 .
The table lists the number of observations-the total as well as the number of observations per percentile bin-for political events, entertainment events, and the full sample. The dataset is skewed towards political and entertainment events, as the two categories together accounts for 82% of the full sample.
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